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ceased the moment the threshold of the wrong room was crossed. 28
This confusion and uncertainty has been remedied in England, where
the courts have discarded the nebulous distinctions between administrative and professional acts and have ruled that the negligence of
a physician 29 or nurse 3 0 is imputed to the employing hospital. In
this country, hospital immunity has been strongly condemned in text
and treatise.3 1 Perhaps in response to this criticism, the recent trend
throughout the nation has been to reduce or eliminate immunity. Thirteen years ago but three states permitted no immunity, 2 whereas
today at least seventeen jurisdictions have explicitly or impliedly
adopted a complete liability rule.83 It is to be hoped that New York,
experiencing the difficulties that plagued other American jurisdictions
and England, will respond by doing away with hospital immunity.
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TORTS

-

LIABILITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF A DANGEROUS IN-

STRUM ENTALITY ON PREMISS.-Plaintiff brought suit for the wrong-

ful death of his twelve-year-old son who plunged through a hoistway
opening on defendants' platform. The platform was located midway
in an alley which, although fenced off, was frequently entered by
school children through a space beneath the fence. The Court held
that by placing an insecure and deceptive covering over the opening,
the defendants created an inherently "dangerous instrumentality" for
which they are liable. Mayer v. Temple Properties, Inc., 307 N.Y.
559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954).
Generally, a possessor of land is not subject to liability for bodily
harm caused to trespassers as a result of his failure either to keep his
land in a safe condition or to carry on activities so as not to endanger
them.' An increasing regard for human safety has led to the development of certain exceptions to this rule of non-liability.2 One such
28 See Necolayff v. Genesee Hosp., 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y.S.2d 832
(4th Dep't 1946), aff'd nwem., 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947).
29 See Cassidy v. Ministry of Health, [1951] 2 K.B. 343, 351.
30
See Gold v. Essex County Council, [1942] 2 K.B. 293, 313 (C.A.).
31 See 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 401 (1953); PROSSER, TORTS
1079 (1941); 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §402 (1939).
32 See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d
810, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
33 See Note, 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 142 (1953), which lists fifteen jurisdictions
as imposing, or tending to impose, complete liability. Since the publication of
that volume, Kansas and Washington have adopted this rule. See Noel v.
Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954); Pierce v. Yakima
Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
1 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 333 (1934).
2 See PROSSER, TORTS 609 (1941).
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exception is popularly alluded to as the theory of "attractive
nuisance." 3 This doctrine is a peculiar creation of the courts, founded
on the reasoning that children, because of their tender years, need
to be protected from their own lack of discretion. 4 The theory had
its origin in the English case of Lynch v. Nurdin,5 decided in 1841.
Thirty-two years later, this view was approved by the United States
Supreme Court in Railroad Co. v. Stout.6 In that case an infant
was injured while unlawfully playing on defendant's unlocked turntable. In allowing recovery, the Court held that an owner of land is
not exempt from
liability for negligence even though the child might
7
be a trespasser.

Although approximately two-thirds of the American jurisdictions
developed an attractive nuisance doctrine, s the adopting courts realized
that the theory might logically be extended to the point of absurdity. 9
Consequently, they soon imposed their own distinctive limitations, with
the result that today there is no uniform application of the rule.10
However, the attractive nuisance doctrine as propounded in the
Restatement 1 substantially
reflects the rule as it is applied in the
2
various jurisdictions.1

3
'Nuisance' because of a supposed analogy to conditions dangerous to
children in the highway; 'attractive' because it was thought essential that the
child be allured onto the land." Id. at 618 n.14.
4 See SE.Y, TORTS § 394 (1939).
5 1 Q.B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841). See Note, 36 A.L.R. 34, 46 (1925).
617 Wall. 657 (U.S. 1873).
7 Id. at 661.
8 See PROssER, ToaRs 618 (1941).
9 "Once it [attractive nuisance] is adopted, there is no logical stopping
place this side of practical insurance of children; for no one can say what will
not prove an attraction to the restless and inventive mind of an active child,
or where a sympathetic jury will say the duty ends." Bottum's Adm'r v.
Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 Atl. 858, 865 (1911).
10 "In some jurisdictions it is repudiated altogether; in others applied strictly;
in others adopted in a more or less modified form; while in others it has been
extended to such a variety of cases that it has lost its original identity and has
become a new rule of the substantive law of negligence." Fusselman v.
Yellowstone Valley Land & Irr. Co., 53 Mont. 254, 163 Pac. 473, 474 (1917).
11 The American Law Institute predicates liability under the attractive nuisance theory if:
"(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the
possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass,
and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and
which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of
death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the
area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as
compared to the risk to young children involved therein." RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 339 (1934).
22See PaossER, TORTS 620-625 (1941).
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New York has refused to approve the attractive nuisance theory. 13
The case cited most frequently to sustain this proposition is Walsh v.
Fitchburg R.R.,14 in which an infant was injured while unlawfully
playing on defendant's turntable. The court, after reviewing the authorities, including the Stout case, held that the facts of the case at bar
did not bring it ".

.

. within any such principle." 15

The application

of the Walsh decision was soon limited. In the case of Johnson v.
City of New York, 16 it was conceded that the ruling in the Walsh case
17
had no application where the danger was located on the public way.
Under such circumstances, it was indicated that a trespasser might
recover. Since the Johnson case, it has been held that infant trespassers might recover for injuries received while playing on an electric wire pole,' 8 piled steel beams, 19 and a truck,20 all of which were
located on a public way.
Where the condition is located on private property, an infant,
to recover in New York, must prove that the condition was inherently
dangerous. 21 This principle may be traced to the case of Travell v.
Bannernan.22 There the infant, though not a trespasser, was injured
by the explosion of a mass of gunpowder which his playmates had
taken from the defendant's land. In allowing recovery, the court
distinguished the Walsh case by holding that explosives, unlike turntables, were inherently dangerous and accordingly required a higher
degree of care. The court pointed out that the defendant should have
foreseen that trespassing children might take the explosives and
thereby injure others. Decisions subsequent to the Bannerman case
have held denatured alcohol, 23 film, 24 and gasoline 25 not to be inher-

3 See Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N.Y. 110, 115, 19 N.E.2d 981, 983
(1939).
14 145 N.Y. 301, 39 N.E. 1068 (1895).
15 Id. at 307, 39 N.E. at 1070.
16208 N.Y. 77, 101 N.E. 691 (1913).
17 Id. at 83, 101 N.E. at 693.
18 See Robertson v. Rockland Light & Power Co., 187 App. Div. 720, 176
N.Y. Supp. 281 (1st Dep't 1919).
19 See Boylhart v. DiMarco & Reimann, Inc., 270 N.Y. 217, 200 N.E. 793
(1936).
20 See Tierney v. New York Dugan Bros., Inc., 288 N.Y. 16, 41 N.E.2d 161
(1942).
2:1 "The rule seems to be thoroughly settled, at least in this State, that a
plaintiff cannot recover . . . unless the article which causes the injury is inherently dangerous." Beickert v. G.M. Laboratories, Inc., 242 N.Y. 168, 172,
151 N.E. 195, 196 (1926). To be inherently dangerous within the rule, the
condition must be one caused by the landholder as opposed to a mere defect.
Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp.,. 296 N.Y. 154, 71 N.E2d 447 (1947);
Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258 N.Y. 181, 179 N.E. 378 (1932).
2271 App. Div. 439, 75 N.Y. Supp. 866 (2d Dep't 1902), rev'd on other
grounds, 174 N.Y. 47, 66 N.E. 583 (1903).
23 See Hall v. New York Telephone Co., 214 N.Y. 49, 108 N.E. 182 (1915)
(alcohol located on public way).
24 See Beickert v. G.M. Laboratories, Inc., supra note 21.
25 See Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N.Y. 110, 19 N.E.2d 981 (1939);
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ently dangerous and injury therefrom not foreseeable. In the recent
case of Kingsland v. Erie County AgricidturalSoc'y,26 explosives were
again held to be inherently dangerous. As in the Bannerman case,
the injured infant was not a trespasser, but had been injured by an
exploding bomb which his brother had taken from the defendant's
fairground. In imposing liability, the court held that the trespass by
the brother and the resulting injury were foreseeable.
In the aforementioned cases, where the condition was located on
private property, no recovery was permitted where the infant himself
had been a trespasser. Recent decisions, however, have shown a
strong tendency toward allowing the infant to recover even where his
injury was the result of his own trespass. Thus in French v. Central
New York Power Corp.,27 the Appellate Division ruled that since
electricity may be inherently dangerous, recovery might be had for
the wrongful death of a child, even if the infant had been a trespasser.
The Appellate Division reiterated this position in the case of Runkel
v. City of New York, 28 which involved an infant who was injured
when a condemned building, located along the public way, collapsed.
The court stated the rule to be that an " [i]njury sustained by any
person, even though he be a trespasser, due to such an inherently
dangerous instrumentality, may be said to have been caused by the
wanton or intentional or inhuman act of the one responsible for its
existence or its removal and will cast him in liability, provided:
(a) that care 'commensurate with the risk involved' has not been
taken to guard against the injury; and (b) that the accident was
'foreseeable' .....

" 29

The rule, as propounded in the French and Runkel cases, was
invoked by the Court of Appeals in the instant decision, where the
dangerous instrumentality was situated approximately one hundred
feet off the public way and fenced in at both ends. The Court pointed
out that liability might attach even though the child might be
a trespasser. Thus it appears that New York requires a possessor of
land to exercise reasonable care to protect trespassing children from
injury. The point of distinction between the New York view toward
infant trespassers and that of other jurisdictions is the requirement
that the condition be inherently dangerous. However, it may be noted
see Flaherty v. Metro Stations, Inc., 202 App. Div. 583, 588, 196 N.Y. Supp. 2,
6-7 (4th Dep't 1922) (concurring opinion), aff'd mere., 235 N.Y. 605, 139 N.E.
753 (1923). But see Parnell v. Holland Furnace Co., 234 App. Div. 567, 256
N.Y. Supp. 323 (4th Dep't), aff'd nwm., 260 N.Y. 604, 184 N.E. 112 (1932)
(In this case the infant was rightfully on the land. The gasoline was in the
tank of an abandoned "pick-up" truck. The court held that the defendant
should have foreseen the propensities of children to climb about abandoned
vehicles.).
26 298 N.Y. 409, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949).
27 275 App. Div. 238, 89 N.Y.S.2d 543 (4th Dep't 1949).
28 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (2d Dep't 1953).
29 Id. at 176, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 488-489.
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that whereas an explosive was sufficient to confer a cause of action on
an infant some fifty years ago, today there need only be a defectivelycovered platform opening. The instant decision indicates that while
New York formally rejects the attractive nuisance doctrine, it will, in
effect, apply its equitable results when the circumstances of the case
require it.

A
TORTS - VETERANS COMPENSATION - CONCURRENT REMEDY
UNDER TORT CLAIMS ACT ALLoWED.-Plaintiff, a veteran, sought

recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained
during an operation performed at a Veterans Administration hospital.
An allegedly defective tourniquet, applied by an attendant, had aggravated a knee injury which the plaintiff incurred during World War II.
Subsequent to the operation, but prior to this action, a veterans compensation award for the original injury was increased. The Court
held that the action was maintainable since the injury had not been
sustained "incident to service," and that the plaintiff was not precluded from recovery by the receipt of disability payments under the
Veterans Act. United States v. Brown, 75 Sup. Ct. 141 (1954).
Although the Federal Tort Claims Act I contains twelve exceptions to governmental liability,2 it does not deny military personnel
the right to sue. Because of the compensation benefits available under
the various veterans acts,3 the unique relationship that exists between
the serviceman and the Government, 4 and the possible adverse effects
on military discipline, 5 the courts have found the problem of suits by
the military a vexatious one. The Supreme Court first dealt with
the question in Brooks v. United States.6 In that case, the Court
reasoned that since the accident had occurred while the servicemen
were on leave, there was no connection between the tort and the military status of the petitioners. Consequently, the cause of action was
not barred by the Government-serviceman relationship. In addition,
the Court, in permitting recovery, held that the receipt of veterans
compensation for the injuries did not constitute an election of rem'28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952).
2Id. § 2680.
3 See Title 38 of the United States Code.
4 "Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen is more distinctively federal in character than that between it and members of its armed
forces." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947). See
Feres5 v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-144 (1950).
See United States v. Brown, 75 Sup. Ct. 141, 143 (1954).
6337 U.S. 49 (1949).

